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Since the end of the Cold War the Alliance’s transformation has erased doubts 
about its survival.  NATO continues to adapt to new threat environments by expanding its 
mission scope to out-of-area operations and by assuming new security missions.  For the 
2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
against the United States and subsequent 11 March 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain 
complicated an already robust Greek security plan. 
Greece’s extensive security planning, in addition to coordinating NATO support, 
highlighted the challenges and readiness requirements for the Alliance in the 21st century.  
Terrorist concerns, burden-sharing, recognition of Greek sovereignty, political limitations 
in deploying NATO’s CBR Defense team and NRF utilization were all elements of the 
challenges faced in security preparation for the Games.   
In assessing the dynamics behind NATO’s history and its security participation in 
the 2004 Summer Olympics, this thesis serves as a case study in the continuing 
transformational role and adaptability of NATO.  Overall, the Alliance’s willingness to 
assume security support to a major international sporting event represented its long-time 
relationship with Greece, its ability to perform significant security missions and its 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine NATO’s role in providing security for 
Greece during the 2004 Summer Olympics.  As NATO continues to redefine itself and 
seek new missions since the end of the Cold War, the focus will be analyzing how 
NATO’s security role for the Olympics is affecting the Greek – NATO relationship and 
the legitimacy of NATO as a whole.  In assessing the dynamics behind NATO security 
actions for the Summer Olympics the intent is to gain a better understanding of the 
transformational role of NATO and it’s implications toward the future of the Alliance. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The 2004 Summer Olympics were awarded to Greece in 1997 by the International 
Olympic Committee, and were held 13 August – 29 August 2004.  In the last several 
years, dramatic changes have occurred in international security.  Athens took great 
measures to prepare itself for the Olympic Games.  NATO’s willingness to involve itself 
in the security of the Olympics serves as a case study in understanding the dynamics 
behind the institutional process within NATO.  With NATO participation in security for 
the Summer Olympics, this is another chapter in the Greek – NATO relationship that has 
existed since Greece’s accession in the Atlantic Alliance in 1952.   
While NATO has been redefining itself, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
against the United States further complicated the security structure.  On 12 March 2004, 
the day after the Madrid bombings in Spain, Greece officially requested NATO 
assistance.  Although this request had been anticipated for some time, Greek political 
debate on constitutional issues regarding foreign military involvement within Greece’s 
territorial borders, rhetoric for international support, increasingly demanding security 
issues and long-standing concerns of domestic terrorism have all influenced Greece’s 
path to Olympic Summer games.  Since the last Summer Olympics in Sydney the cost of 
security more than tripled to over $1 billion.  NATO’s willingness to share in the burden 
of security responsibilities in Greece not only is beneficial to NATO’s survival, but 
critical to understanding the dynamics behind the NATO institutional process and how it 
continues to benefit the relationships within the Alliance and the Alliance itself. 
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C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
The questions are the following: 
• What is the significance for NATO in providing security at a major 
sporting event such as the Summer Olympics? 
• What is the history between Greece and NATO and how have the 
dynamics within this relationship affected security arrangements at the 
Olympics?  
• What are the institutional and operational implications for NATO and its 
allies within the Alliance given its security involvement in the 2004 
Summer Olympics?   
The argument follows: 
The 2004 Summer Olympics was hosted by Greece and it came at a time of 
NATO transformation and heightened security against terrorism since 11 September 
2001.  International attention was high.  Although some believe NATO continues to live 
beyond its expiration date, this event was an ideal tool that should strengthen the premise 
NATO continues to adapt in order to meet new security threats and challenges.  This 
international event will contribute to the further understanding of the modern dynamics 
within the NATO institutional process.   
The planning, protection and execution considerations of the Olympics are 
representative of the complex security issues facing Europe today.  NATO is a flexible 
alliance that demonstrates its ability to seek out new missions in today’s terrorist threat 
environment.  Analyzing how this sporting event influences security concerns and why 
NATO seeks involvement in this mission is indicative of the dynamics behind NATO’s 
flexibility and European national security concerns.  NATO’s actions at the 2004 
Summer Olympics represent another chapter in NATO’s history that reflects the 
importance of Alliance security mission preparedness.  The level of cooperation in the 
Greek – NATO relationship within the context of this event is representative of the 
flexibility that must exist in order for NATO to continue to transform and remain a 
credible institution.  
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines the elements of NATO security involvement in the 2004 
Summer Olympics hosted by Greece.  Examining Greek and NATO history is important 
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context within the focus of tracing the events that shaped the security structure for the 
Games.  By tracing the evolution of events between Greece and NATO, the main 
assumption is Greece’s absolute intention of being prepared for the security of the 2004 
Summer Olympics.  Analytical approaches are used to assess official Greek and NATO 
statements and various sources.  My focus is on senior Greek and NATO government 
officials, to include member nation leaders as appropriate, and their interaction on the 
national and NATO decision-making process. 
My primary sources are high-level speeches, policy, journal articles and archives.  
Secondary sources are news sources, books with reference to official and/or declassified 
documents, and official government/NATO website references. 
E. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 
In the early part of 2004, as world attention focused on the crisis in Iraq, Summer 
Olympics preparations came at a rapid pace, with many outside observers concerned 
about its readiness during an era of heightened terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts.  
These games were significant not only because they returned to their birth place, Greece, 
but because it was the first time the Summer Olympics were held in a post-September 11 
world.  Its importance was notable.  Olympic security preparations came at a time when 
the world now faced the modern security concerns of terrorism, and for Greece, the host 
nation of the 2004 Summer Olympics, security planning for the Olympics was a critical 
time in which it is faced enormous pressure to guarantee the safety of the Games.  At the 
same time, hosting a successful Olympics meant the prospects of a reemerging new and 
modern Greece.   
While some may perceive Greece ancient in its way of thinking and steeped in its 
desire to preserve tradition, Greece has managed to integrate and achieve continued 
cooperation in external security actors, that being NATO and the European Union.  
Having been a member of NATO since 1952, Greece has been a long-time member of 
NATO sharing the burdens and benefits of collective defense.  NATO, in its post-Cold 
War transformation, established its relationship with Greece to assist in maintaining 
stability and security in Southeastern Europe.   
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As Greece made final security arrangements for the Summer Olympics, NATO 
was ready to support Greece in enhancing the security capabilities for the Olympics.  In 
analyzing Greece and its evolving identity in relation to its membership within NATO, 
Greece’s hosting of the 2004 Summer Olympics highlighted recent dynamics behind the 
nature of the Greek- NATO relationship.  This paper will assess the elements of this 
relationship as Greece manages its own national identity and as NATO engages in 
security missions of the 21st century. 
In an attempt to outline research findings, several observations become evident.  
First, NATO’s involvement in the Games is a continuation of its new security direction 
firmly established in the 1990s.  Second, Greece’s request for NATO support revealed 
elements of Greek domestic public opinion and national security concerns that have long 
been rooted in Greek history; for NATO a continuing act of balancing Greek national 
strategy and NATO transformation commitments.  Third, the consequences of such 
security missions, as it experienced in the Summer Olympics, indicate NATO will 
continue to face these challenges when planning similar missions.  Fourth, NATO’s 
security mission for the Olympics, even though peripheral or in the “outer core” mission 
spectrum contributed to the success of the Games, protecting Athens from terrorism, 
fulfilling a concrete security requirement NATO is currently able to perform.  
Understanding NATO’s role in the 2004 Summer Olympics and Greece’s impact on the 
overall security arrangements during the Games is part of a continuing assessment of the 
dynamics surrounding NATO and its adaptability to the 21st century. 
The first chapter discusses Greece’s history of foreign intervention and Greece’s 
needs for NATO security.  The second chapter highlights NATO transformation and its 
new efforts toward security and its global outlook in its fight against terrorism.  This 
chapter also describes NATO security role during the 2004 Summer Olympics.  The third 
chapter analyzes Greek and NATO cooperation in meeting the security requirements for 
the Olympics.  The final chapter concludes with observations from the Greek-NATO 
experience during the Olympics.  While Greece and NATO encountered challenges while 
framing NATO involvement in the security for the Summer Olympics, the benefits of the 
Alliance’s contribution are a reflection of continued efforts to promote allied solidarity 
and security commitments for the 21st century. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF GREECE AND NATO 
Athens alone- Greece with its immortal glories- is free.1 
A. THE ORIGINS OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY 
In understanding Greek foreign policy after World War II two long-term trends 
stand out: (1) its strategic location and (2) its history of foreign intervention.  Since 
ancient times Greece’s location has placed it at a crossroads marked by influence from 
the West and East.  From the Holy Roman Empire to the Ottoman Empire, Greeks 
endured change.2  In the 19th century the West, with its European ideals described the 
Greek War of Independence (1821-1831) as “a sentimental search for the Greek roots of 
European culture.”3  Lord Byron’s romantic portrayal of Greek independence inspired 
many to come to the aid of Greek revolutionists.4  To him and others, “Greece…was not 
just any country in which a war of independence had broken out, but one which in 
antiquity had served as an example of all that was most manly, heroic, and beautiful.  
Greece deserved to be free.”5    
In reality, Greece’s strategic significance was apparent through the early 
intervention of the Great Powers.  Britain, France and Russia, as Greece’s “protectors” 
vied for influence with the Greek state in both domestic and international affairs.6  After 
World War II, however France’s influenced lessened and Britain, into the late 1940s was 
                                                 
1 Wolff, Larry, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 2.  Quote from Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech 
given in Fulton, Missouri at Westminster College on 05 March 1946. 
2 For a history of Greece refer to C.M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History, (London: Faber 
and Faber Limited, 1998). 
3 Mosse, George L., Fallen Soldiers- Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 28. 
4 Ibid, 29. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Greece: A Profile, Chapter 1, “International Foreign Policy Up to the Second World War,” (Athens: 
International Studies Association, 1988), 1. 
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increasingly unable to financially support Greece.7  With British leadership unable to 
continue its financial support to Greece, the rising threat of communism, and the 
increasing concerns of Greek Civil War further destabilizing the region, the United States 
came to the aid of Greece.  In order to fully affect the recovery of Greece, the U.S. played 
a major role in Greek development.  In coming to the aid of Greece, what became known 
as the “Truman Doctrine,” became the first phase “in a far larger design still to be worked 
out in the form of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty.”8 
By the end of 1946 several international developments prompted the U.S. 
administration to become more involved in the Eastern Mediterranean region.  George 
Kennan’s Long Telegram, Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, Soviet pressure 
toward Turkey for annexation of the Black Sea straits to the Soviets,9 the advance 
notification of Britain’s increasing inability to support Greece and Turkey, and the start 
of civil war (between communist insurgents and the Greek government) in Greece all 
heightened concerns about the spread of communism.  All these factors carried influence, 
but it was George Kennan’s Long Telegram that drove the ideological desire to “contain” 
Soviet expansion.  In February 1946, George Kennan, the U.S. ambassador to Russia, 
sent his “Long Telegram” from Moscow to U.S. leadership.  His letter effectively alerted 
policymakers to the sources of Soviet hostilities.  As a response to Soviet expansionist 
behavior, he suggested strong resistance which would deter and ultimately weaken the 
Soviet regime against the “Western World.”10  In what became known as a policy of 
“containment,” President Truman developed an ideological doctrine to fight the 
                                                 
7 Goodpaster, Andrew J., “The Truman Doctrine: Turning Point in World History,” The Truman 
Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective,” Rossides, Eugene T. and Demetrios James Caraley 
ed., (New York, NY: American Hellenic Institute Foundation and The Academy of Political Science, 
1998), 43.  Great Britain officially informed the United States of its inability to support Greece and Turkey 
against Soviet influence in February 1947.  Hamby states advance notice of Britain’s inability to support 
Greece was actually given earlier in the fall of 1946, 21.  
8 Hamby, Alonzo L., “Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine,” The Truman 
Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective,” Rossides, Eugene T. and Demetrios James Caraley 
ed., (New York, NY: American Hellenic Institute Foundation and The Academy of Political Science, 
1998), 22. 
9 Hamby, 21.  According to the author, in a move of symbolic support toward Turkey, remains of the 
deceased Turkish ambassador who had passed away in Washington were returned to Turkey on the USS 
Missouri. 
10 Harper, John Lamberton, American Visions of Europe- Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, 
and Dean G. Acheson, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 191. 
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oncoming perils of communism; Greece was strategically located at the center of this 
fight.   
In the summer of 1946 Greek delegates meet in Washington to discuss Greece’s 
financial situation.11  Out of this meeting the American Mission for Aid (AMAG) was 
conceived.  Later in 1947 an American survey of the economic conditions in Greece was 
reported on through a memorandum known as the Porter Report, whereby the extent of 
U.S. involvement in Greek policy was revealed: 
The Greek Government should be induced to employ American citizens as 
individuals in key executive positions.  These men who will be selected 
with the advice of the Mission will be in a position to see that official 
policy is carried through in the day-to-day operations of the government.12 
What was becoming apparent was, in the words of Theodore Kariotis, “the future 
of Greek economic development lay exclusively in the hands of American planners 
responsible not only for the reconstruction of the Greek economy but also for its future 
path.”13  Here, the ideological opportunities alluded to earlier involving “containment” of 
the Soviet Union laid the groundwork for significant U.S. involvement in Greece.  The 
Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East region, no doubt, posed both ideological and 
specific strategic benefits: 
Only Greece, Turkey, and Iran separated the Russians from the ‘Black 
gold’ of the Persian Gulf, and each of these nations, in the eyes of U.S. 
policymakers, appeared dangerously susceptible to Soviet influence and 
control.14 
Defending Greece from communism was “crucial to control of…that veritable 
crossroads between East and West: the eastern Mediterranean, which offered access to 
                                                 
11 Kariotis, Theodore C., “The Economy: Growth Without Equity,” Greece in the Twentieth Century, 
edited by Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2003), 245.  
12 Ibid, 246.  The author describes the Porter Report actually as two reports; one classified 
“confidential” and another classified “secret.”  The “secret” report was published in Greece, but the 
“confidential” version was not.  This quote is the “confidential” version.  Kariotis also notes the “secret” 
published report used language such as, “’foreign’ individuals who would advise the Greek Government,” 
implying a more politically acceptable language in light of the belief that the U.S. were the primary 
influence in Greek affairs.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Wittner, Lawrence S., American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 36. 
8 
the oil-rich Middle East and therefore presented the alluring possibility of America’s 
enemies forcing the demise of its West European allies...”15   
Post World War II, Greece was a country devastated by war and ravaged by 
German Nazi occupation, yet its national Greek culture had survived just as it did under 
Ottoman rule in the 1800s.16  While the Greek government endured civil war against 
insurgent Greek communists (ELAS),17 remaining British forces assisted in maintaining a 
moderately stable political base oriented toward Western ideals.18  This allowed Greece 
to maintain relatively stability in order to begin its recovery, but it would ultimately mean 
relying on U.S. leadership.  Greece needed to rebuild its country and it was the 
Americans who saw ideological opportunities in utilizing Greece to further U.S. foreign 
policy.19 
B. IMPLEMENTING THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
Through the Truman Doctrine Greece became a vital part of the U.S. grand 
strategy of “containment”, one that would later expand to NATO and its allies throughout 
the Cold War.  In practical terms, the Truman Doctrine and later, together with the 
Marshall Plan took the form of significant external support offering extensive military 
and economic aid to Greece.  On 12 March 1947 President Truman proposed support to 
Greece in a speech to Congress.  In asking for $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey 
he also made it known that, “it must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside 
                                                 
15 Jones, Howard, “A Reassessment of the Truman Doctrine and Its Impact on Greece and U.S. 
Foreign Policy,” The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective,” Rossides, Eugene T. 
and Demetrios James Caraley ed., (New York, NY: American Hellenic Institute Foundation and The 
Academy of Political Science, 1998), 26. 
16 For a complete history on this period refer to Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism, Gondicas, 
Dimitri and Charles Issawi ed., (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1999). 
17 For a complete history of the domestic and external dimensions of the Greek Civil War refer to: 
John O. Iatrides, “Greece at the Crossroads, 1944-1950,” Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its 
Legacy, Iatrides, John O. and Linda Wrigley ed., (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1995). 
18 Payne, Stanley G., A History of Fascism: 1914-1945, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1995), 317. 
19 This is a reference to the eventual U.S. policy of “containment” which is discussed on the following 
page. 
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pressures.”20  With an overall view of Greece needing significant aid, the United States, 
through the Truman Doctrine and later, with the added insurance of the Marshall Plan, 
intended to promote a liberal ideology and reconstruction effort of the Greek economy21 
and Europe.  To Kennan, “the Truman Doctrine and NATO were reasonable translations 
of containment, but they seemed too dependent on military strength and too neglectful of 
moral leadership.”22  Having to rely on close diplomatic and economic ties to the U.S., 
Greece was heavily influenced by the West.23  Despite criticism, the Greek-Turkish aid 
bill passed in Congress and was signed into law on 22 May 1947.  
Several months after President Truman’s famous speech to Congress, the U.S. 
began operationalizing its aid promises.  On 15 July 1947 AMAG arrived in Greece and 
began to assist Greek leadership.  U.S. political influence was strong in three areas: the 
establishment of a monarchy, control over Greek parliamentary dynamics and influence 
with the Greek army.24  First, the issue of the monarchy is significant because of its 
history and what it meant to the Greek elite.  In general the Greek monarchy structure had 
always been supported by three European powers: Britain, France and Russia.25  At the 
end of World War II, France’s ability to intervene had been weakened and Britain and 
Russia were left to intervene in Greek matters.  Although this made foreign relations 
complex for Greece, with the British unable to continue its support in the late 1940s, the 
U.S. had come to view the monarchy as a source of stability, “a stable political body 
around which anti-communist political forces could unite” with the King being the 
“ultimate guarantor of political stability, military preparedness and loyalty to the western 
                                                 
20 From Truman Presidential Museum and Library online, Student Activity: Harry Truman and the 
Truman Doctrine, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm.  Accessed 07 September 2004.  
Note: aid went to Turkey as well. 
21 Tayfur, M. Fatih, Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and 
Spain, (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 44. 
22 Kaplan, Lawrence S., NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, (New York: Twayne 
Publishers, 1994, Updated ed.), 14.   
23 Tayfur, 46.  In 1948 Greece signed the US-Greek Economic Agreement and in 1953 it agreed to 
devalue the Drachma in order to open its economy and increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
24 Ibid, 49.  Couloumbis in Greece in the Twentieth Century, 38, notes American intervention from 
1947-1949 helped to end the Greek Civil War by preventing communist success.  The Greek majority 
acknowledged this by building a statue of Harry Truman. 
25 For a complete history dating back to the War of Independence from the Ottomans, refer to Greece: 
A Profile, Chapter 1, “International Foreign Policy Up to the Second World War,” (Athens: International 
Studies Association, 1988). 
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alliance.”26  In order to further U.S. success, however, sentiment in the Greek Parliament 
had to be stabilized as well.  Secondly, the U.S. desire to control parliamentary discord 
focused on bringing together both liberal and conservative forces that largely disagreed 
over the authority of the monarchy.27  The U.S. was able to compel both sides to 
cooperate in order to receive aid, thus uniting the parliamentary forces.  
Lastly, significant U.S. involvement also appeared in the Greek military chain-of-
command.  Influence in the Greek army, as Tayfur puts it, was “the main bastion of the 
Americans.”28  The reason for this is understandable from the perspective of the U.S.  
Given communist involvement in the Civil War and the potential pressures that could 
come from communist Russia, the U.S. had no choice but to make the Greek army a 
critical role in the defeat of communism.29  All of these factors demonstrate the deep 
involvement the United States had in Greek administration and policy; a level of 
assistance that starting in the early 1960s would lead to Greek leadership desiring other 
“alliances” beyond NATO.    
On 04 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was finally signed.  With the political 
and economic support established through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 
1947, support for collective defense, in order to protect the Euro-Atlantic region to allow 
for the recovery of Western Europe.  In 1952 the ex-chief of the Greek Military Staff, 
Marshal Papagos became the head of the conservative Greek Rally Party and won the 
elections.  Leading conservative Kanellopoulos, stated, “Greece’s membership in the 
NATO was a very good thing and hence prolonged debates on the subject were not 
required” believing this would, “insult the western allies.”30  Thus, despite apparent 
opposition, both Greek right wing and centrist parliamentary elites were able to place 
great importance on NATO membership.  What this meant however, was: 
                                                 
26 Tayfur, 48.  The author quotes J.O. Iatrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of 
Postwar Greece,” from Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review, (NY: Pella Publishing Company, 
1980), 49-73. 
27 Ibid.  The source of disagreement over this issue seems to originate from a rift between King 
Constantine and Prime Minster Venizelos at the outbreak of World War I.  The King wanted to remain 
neutral (because he was married to one of the German emperor’s sisters) while the Prime Minister favored 
siding with the Allies.  For complete reference refer to note 22, Chapter 1, 6. 
28 Ibid, 49. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Tayfur, 52. 
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Defense and security policies and investments would be planned 
according to the needs of the Atlantic Alliance rather than Greece’s 
specific interests.  In other words, NATO membership would be beneficial 
only if Greek ‘national interests’ coincided with the global interests of the 
Alliance.31 
On 18 February 1952 Greece joined NATO.  During the 1950s Greek national security 
paralleled U.S. foreign policy.  Support to the Greek army and armed forces included 
American equipment, training and education to hundreds of officers.32  Specifically in the 
Greek army, its secret agents and intelligence capabilities, served as the main agent 
against internal threats, the “internal enemy- communism.”33  Greece assumed this 
internally focused defense posture until the mid-1960s.  NATO expectations of Greece 
consisted of a “delay to Soviet and satellite forces”34 should there be an attack.   
C. GREEK-NATO TENSION OVER CYPRUS, 1955 
As NATO leadership worked to develop a nuclear strategy, however rising 
tensions on Cyprus in the mid-1950s caused increased tensions in Greece toward NATO.  
Increasing calls for énosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece, was strong with four-fifths 
of the Cypriot population being associated with the Greek “language, sentiment and 
religion.”35  In the summer of 1954 the situation was presented to the United Nations 
(UN), but later in December did not move to take any action.  As a result, by April of 
1955 both violence in Cyprus and ill feelings of inaction by the UN created, “bitter 
disappointment in the public mind both with Britain and the USA, whose representatives 
voted with the British and the UN,”36 further aggravated the crisis.  According to 
Woodhouse this “outbreak of nationalism” brought about a Turkish reaction of 
nationalism.37  Although the Greek government attempted to manage the crisis, anti-
Greek violence in Istanbul forced Greek forces to leave a NATO exercise and reduce its 
                                                 
31 Tayfur, 52. 
32 Dokos, Thanos P., “Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting,” Greece in the Twentieth Century, 
edited by Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2003), 45. 
33 Tayfur, 50. 
34 Dokos, 45. 
35 Woodhouse, 269. 
36 Woodhouse, C.M., “Modern Greece,” A Short History of Greece, Heurtley, W.A., H.C. Darby, 
C.W. Crawley and C.M. Woodhouse (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 166. 
37 Woodhouse, C.M., Modern Greece: A Short History, 270. 
12 
involvement from other allied activities.38  Even though the North Atlantic Council was 
unable to resolve the crisis in 1955, later in 1960, under the auspices of NATO, Greece, 
Turkey and Cypriot leaders agreed to establish Cyprus as an independent Republic.39  
The election of Constantine Karamanlis in 1955, though, brought a new Greek policy 
orientation toward NATO.  Greece would support NATO, but also look to Europe for 
new support.   
In the early 1950s Constantine Karamanlis was a rising star in the Greek Rally 
Party.  As the Minister of Public Works, he became recognized under the Prime Minister 
Papagos.  After Papagos’ death Karamanlis was chosen by the King to form a new party.  
Under the name of the National Radical Union (ERE) his first term of office lasted until 
1963.  While in office, Karamanlis believed: 
Greece’s fortunes lay with the West and that Greece must become 
‘European’.  Karamanlis wanted to move closer to Europe than 
membership in NATO alone, so in 1962 he won associate status for 
Greece in the European Community.40   
Additionally, Karamanlis looked to Europe as a political “model.”  In interpreting 
this model, Arghyrios Fatouros believes, “membership in the EC meant, among other 
things, the entrenchment in Greece of democratic government, that is to say, fundamental 
freedoms, majority rule, the rule of law- what other terminology is called the bourgeois 
parliamentary system.”41 
D. THE DECLINE OF U.S. DEPENDENCY 
With these economic concerns and political motives, the early 1960s brought 
forces to bear in Greek politics that combined for an influence away from U.S. pressures.  
According to Tayfur two important events changed Greece’s foreign policy orientation, 
“the association of Greece with the EEC and the enactment of new incentive laws for the 
inflow of foreign investment capital.”  The impact of these developments he believes, 
                                                 
38 Woodhouse, 273. 
39 Ibid, 279. 
40 http://www.gogreece.com/learn/history/Rise_Karamanlis.html.  Accessed 05 August 2004. 
41 Fatouros, Arghytrios A., “Political and Institutional Facets of Greece’s Integration in the European 
Community,” Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order, Edited by Harry J. 
Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, (New York, New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), 
Chapter 2, 29. 
13 
“challenged the vested interests of the American-oriented, periphery-like traditional 
economic elite.”42  And so, ultimately, these economic pressures challenged American 
interests.  By 1962 economic additional economic pressure on Greece came from the 
termination of U.S. civil aid.  The economic revival experienced in the 1950s was 
slowing and this provided further incentive for Greece to seek out economic support.  In 
1962 Greece signed the Athens Agreement, which was intended to assist Greece toward 
full membership.43  The Athens Agreement was based on Article 238 of the Treaty of 
Rome and it was aimed to bring equilibrium to the balance of payments, balance 
economic growth and stabilize price volatility.44  The economic state and its uncertainty 
toward stability led to unrest.45  Both political parties in the early 1960s, that is, 
Karamanlis’ ERE and George Papandreou’s Center Union Party (CU), (which came to 
power starting in 1964) resisted U.S. pressure.  After assuming office, Papandreou 
pushed to revise foreign investment agreements and desired a shift to “import substitution 
industrialization.”46  Even the conservative Karamanlis, “despite his anti-Communist and 
pro-American credentials, began to resist U.S. influence and manipulation.”47 
It was also during the mid-1960s that George Papandreou’s son, Andreas, became 
a rising notable in Greek politics.  Expected to follow in his father’s footsteps, he “was 
linked by public opinion…toward the Left.”48  Together, the Papandreous believed things 
needed to change, “the Americans would have to learn that Greece belonged to Greeks, 
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that it was an ally but not a satellite.”49  At the time, it was thought the rising support the 
Papandreous received could damage U.S. interests with the King fearing a potential end 
to the Greek Monarchy.50  A change in control, however, did not come through elections; 
it came in the form of a military coup in April 1967. 
E. THE JUNTA AND TURKISH INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS 
Anti-western, specifically anti-American sentiment was most visible during the 
military dictatorship period of rule from 1967-1974 and the subsequent Turkish 
intervention into the island of Cyprus.  After the resignation of George Papandreou in 
1965 and the failure to obtain stability through several cycles of governments, King 
Constantine set elections for May 1967.  On 21 April 1967 a military coup took place 
assuming control of the Greek government.51  During the coup, NATO allies “confined 
themselves to verbal condemnation because the regime fulfilled every geopolitical 
requirement, anchoring the alliance’s defenses in the unstable eastern Mediterranean.”52  
By 1973 the military regime, or junta, was losing control as evidenced in its brutal 
response to a student demonstration at the National Polytechnic University of Athens in 
November 1973.  In July 1975, when Greek Cypriots, supported by the junta,53 attempted 
to overthrow the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, on 20 July 1975 the Turkish 
government intervened and moved troops into the Kyrenia region.54  Observers soon 
learned that the coup d’état was backed by the U.S. government.  In effect, this 
knowledge, coupled with a U.S. diplomatic stance oriented toward mutual support of 
Turkey gave further reason for the Greek political elite to seek alternate relationships, 
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more multilateral in nature to meet its security needs.  The junta period and its resulting 
effect on the island of Cyprus was a significant period in Greek history.   
Greek popular opinion reflected the perceived failure of the United States and 
NATO to act on Greece’s behalf.  Furthermore, apparent U.S. support of Turkish actions 
created a severe backlash that lead Greece to temporarily leave the NATO integrated 
military structure.55  According to S. Victor Papacosma, Karamanlis “later divulged that 
only two choices lay before him: to declare war against Turkey or to restrict links with 
NATO.  He chose, in his estimation, the lesser of evils.”56  Soon after, relations became 
more positive and Greece rejoined NATO, but despite a period of détente with NATO 
since that time, elements of this historical tension still exist.57  
  Increasingly, Greek leaders realized NATO could not alone offer the security 
requirements Greece felt it needed.  The rule of the military dictatorship and NATO’s 
non-compliance in coming to the aid of Greece, in Greek eyes, served to embitter 
relations between Greece and NATO.  What became clear in the late 1970s was a 
movement to abandon its dependence on the U.S. in both military and political realms.58       
As Yiorgos Choulairas explains, “this fusion substantially accounts for why the 
fragility of heritages and identities is matched by their resilience.”59  Regarding Greece 
today, he brings interesting perspective to light: 
The question regarding Greek culture…is neither whether Greeks will lose 
their “Greekness” nor whether they will cling to the myths of their 
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national character.  Instead, the question is how will Greeks reinvent 
themselves in the context of a reinvented Europe.60 
New direction and concrete action toward democratic consolidation came with 
Karamanlis returning to power after the military coup ended in 1974.  Maybe not 
necessarily a “reinvention,” but Karamanlis’ beliefs and charisma became an important 
factor in bringing Greece closer to the EU, by moving “in the direction of becoming a 
‘civil society.’”61  The Truman Doctrine had lost its luster.  While valuing American 
support, Greece would look to foreign policy options that meant less direct U.S. 
intervention.       
F. THE KARAMANLIS YEARS, 1974-1981 
With Constantine Karamanlis’ appointment to Prime Minister on 24 July 1974, 
democratic elections were held and under a new party name, New Democracy, (center 
right in orientation) he was elected into office in late 1974.  By the early 1970s, 
economic, political and security transformations were all taking place.  In 1974 several 
key developments took place that defined Greece’s independence from Western 
influence: the disestablishment of the monarchy, the installation of civilian rule over the 
military, and the shift away from its Atlanticist stance in NATO.  Karamanlis, having 
returned from self-exile in Paris, took to reform.  He first abolished the monarchy.  In a 
referendum, approximately 70 percent of voters, voted against it.62  What was once a 
political structure that maintained close relations with American leadership and, 
“established as the agent of foreign powers” was officially ended in December 1974.63   
Likewise, in addition to this political change he also took measures to orient the 
Greek military toward defense as opposed to direct political influence.64  He believed the 
military should, “be transformed into a respectable organization that would satisfy both 
its members and Greek civilians.”65  Ultimately, “after years of active intervention in 
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Greek politics, the military was subordinated to civilian rule.”66  Finally, Karamanlis took 
further domestic action in an effort to fully consolidate Greek democracy by legalizing 
the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was an important additional act that essentially 
“moved the country to its Western destiny.”67   
Another critical change in Greece came with Karamanlis’ shift in 1974 away from 
full support toward the Atlantic Alliance.  Tayfur points to several reasons why this 
occurred.  First, as a result of what he terms “inaction” from NATO to respond to the 
Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Greece withdrew from the military structure of NATO in 
August, showing, “Greek ‘national interests’ would now come first, and would no longer 
be sacrificed to the interests of NATO or the U.S.”68  To the Greeks, the Turkish 
intervention was an attack.  After the Cyprus crisis in 1974, Greece’s security concerns 
focused on Turkey’s “revisionist” policy toward Greece.69   
In addition to Greece’s general policy shift away from NATO involvement, 
Greece took specific action in deciding to reduce the number of U.S. bases located in 
Greece from seven to four and transferred control of the bases to Greece, “with the 
insistence that the operation of the bases would be permitted only when it was considered 
necessary for Greek national interests.”70  According to Tayfur, the result of Karmanlis’ 
new direction (of re-orienting Greece’s position in its trans-Atlantic relations) meant 
Karamanlis could begin with his intention of pursuing Greek membership into the EC.  In 
looking first to France and Germany, Karamanlis desired to lessen its security reliance on 
the U.S. by initiating military contracts with France and by generating interest in French 
investment.71  
In William H. McNeill’s book published in 1978, he commented on Greece’s 
aspirations in joining the EC saying, “the thought that Greece may now be ready to ‘join                                                  
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Europe’ by becoming a member of the Economic Community has a considerable appeal 
in a time when Greeks keenly feel the need for external support against the Turks.”72 
His point at first seems unsupported, but additional research reveals he may be 
more accurate than initially expected.  In tracing Greece’s efforts to utilize NATO and 
the EU to provide security, Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tournikiotis stated,  
NATO’s ‘failure’ to provide Greece with the expected security guarantees 
intensified…the search for an alternative.  In fact, Greece’s membership in 
the EC, though largely economically motivated, was also meant to bolster 
the existing Greek government and, most importantly, to strengthen the 
country’s international position, especially its deterrent capability against 
Turkey.73 
A few years later, in 1980, and after “lengthy negotiations” Greece’s full 
membership into NATO was reinstated.74  Approximately six years after Greece 
withdrew from the military structure of NATO due to its dispute over Turkish 
involvement in Cyprus, Greece finally became a full member of NATO again.  (In 1981 
Greece joined the EC).  This very fact demonstrates the delicate nature of the Greek-
Turkish relationship and what it means to the Alliance.  This history demonstrates the 
importance of unique Greek security concerns over a long period of time in regards to 
Turkey.  As expressed by Geoffrey Pridham: 
Karamanlis’ careful handling of relations with Turkey during the later 
1970s was driven by his overriding concern for democratization, for any 
out-break of conflict might have had destabilizing effects at home.  The 
link between this and the European option had a profound meaning for a 
country with a background of foreign intervention.75   
Overall, historical disagreements regarding Aegean airspace, territorial waters, 
and challenges to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention have generated ebbs and flows of 
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tension between Greece and Turkey.  The Imia crisis in January 1996 was one example of 
heightened tension, leaving the two alliance members close to war.76   
G. GREECE AND NATO INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 
A year later, 1997 proved to be a better year for NATO and Greece.  As a 
measure of good faith, Greece and Turkey signed the Madrid Joint Declaration, agreeing 
to “settle their differences with peaceful means, on the basis of mutual consensus and 
without the use, or threat of use, of violence.”77  More concrete results with Greece and 
NATO came with the new headquarters role in Larissa as one of the four Joint Sub-
Regional Commands.78  During the years 1998 and 1999, the NATO bombing campaign 
in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) brought significant public 
opposition to the NATO bombings.  According to a poll by the Greek newspaper Ta Nea, 
95 percent of Greeks opposed NATO’s actions.79  Although opposed to military action, 
Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou did not reject NATO’s decision.80  The Greek 
government’s delicate handling of managing domestic pro-Serb orientations was an 
initial signal of Greece’s turn to cooperative regional foreign policy.   
As history has demonstrated the Greek- NATO relationship has often hinged on 
the status of relations between Greece and Turkey.  In recent years, Greece has engaged 
in a rapprochement with Turkey.  In 2000, earthquakes and U.S. encouragement came 
through visits by President Clinton.  According to an article in the Los Angeles Times, 
then Greece Foreign Minister George Papandreou and Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail 
Cem signed five agreements in an effort to “build enough trust to help tackle the most 
sensitive disputes between the neighboring North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies- 
over rival territorial claims in the Aegean Sea and over how to reunify ethnic Greek and 
Turkish communities on the partitioned island of Cyprus.”81  
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As evidenced in this chapter, the year 1974 was a significant year in the history of 
Greece, for its own sake and in relations with NATO.  It marked the symbolic trek toward 
its own destiny.  As Dokos notes, politically, this new period of history from 1974 to the 
present, “has been characterized by the diversification of Greece’s external relationships, 
including a relative weakening of its ties with the U.S. in favor of closer economic and 
political integration into Western Europe and improved relations with Eastern Europe.”82 
The year 1974 was also significant because, as in previous years, it demonstrated 
how the unique regional tensions between Greece and Turkey can affect their NATO 
relationship.  NATO has always been aware of the stresses Greek-Turkish disputes put on 
the Alliance.  In recent years, rapprochement between Greece and Turkey has been 
promising.  Greece has been following a positive policy orientation toward NATO and 
with the EU and, in rhetoric, the newly elected Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis 
expressed his desire for Greece “to be among the avant-garde in the newly enlarged 
EU.”83     
For several decades, starting in the mid- 20th century, the relationship between 
Greece and NATO was uneasy at times, but always strategically beneficial.  NATO 
valued Greece’s membership and solidarity in securing the Alliance’s southern flank, 
while Greece relied on NATO to balance against any Turkish action.  Since the mid 
1970s Greece has positioned itself ever closer to its European neighbors.  Today, Greece 
looks to regional leadership, strong ties to the EU and NATO and seeks global 
recognition as a modern Greece for the 21st century. 
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III. NATO TRANSFORMATION AND ITS ROLE IN OLYMPIC 
SECURITY 
  Throughout its history, NATO has always been ready to meet  
new threats and seize new opportunities.  That is why the Alliance  
still matters and why NATO remains the key to stability and  
security of the Euro-Atlantic area.84 
 
 
A. HISTORY OF NATO SECURITY TRANSFORMATION 
In April 1949 NATO was established under the individual and collective defense 
premises within Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.  Granted, when the Treaty was 
established, its inherent aim was to protect allied members from the aggression of the 
former Soviet Union.  Within the Treaty, however, fundamental security obligations were 
given, as reflected in Article 4, “The parties will consult together whenever, in the 
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any 
of the Parties is threatened.”85  NATO, throughout the Cold War, played an important 
role in maintaining strategic stability through its core collective defense function.  Yet, 
even during the Cold War, pursuing security concerns were evident in NATO strategy.   
1. The Impact of the Harmel Report 
In 1967 NATO formally addressed these security concerns through the Harmel 
Report.  Based on a dual track of continuing defense measures and achieving détente 
between the East and West, efforts were aimed at increasing the security of NATO 
members through military and political mechanisms.  The impact of the Harmel Report 
was significant because it laid the groundwork for future Alliance security measures.  
According to author Stanley Sloan, in what may be the most lasting contribution of the 
Harmel Report, was reflected in the efforts in the 1980s which culminated in agreement 
to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.  It served to “help ease the transition 
from Cold War confrontation to a more cooperative security system in Europe.”86     
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2. NATO Strategic Concepts       
 Towards the end of the 20th century several events influenced a new strategic 
direction for NATO.  The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and reforms in the Soviet Union 
in early 1990 dissolved the strength behind the Iron Curtain.  Quickly following, coalition 
operations and crisis in the former Yugoslavia pressed the Alliance to pursue new 
strategic direction.  As reflected in its 1991 Strategic Concept, the Alliance demonstrated 
the desire for a new broad approach to security.87  NATO’s role in the Balkans became 
an opportunity for its new security, peacekeeping functions.  In what was the largest 
NATO military action taken in its history, NATO began its presence in the region with 
the Implementation Force (IFOR) and then sustained its operations with the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR).  From its new Strategic Concept NATO allies took several important steps 
forward that allowed the Alliance more flexibility.  In 1994 at a Brussels summit allied 
members agreed to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which allowed 
greater flexibility and a more adequate command structure in order to provide for new 
security missions.88  In 1996 NATO produced the Berlin Accord, an important document 
that signaled NATO’s move toward the European Security and Defense Identity (EDSI).  
Accordingly, “the Berlin Accord was designed to help transform NATO’s role for the 
post-Cold War world, respond to calls from Congress for more effective sharing of 
international security burdens, and accommodate a more cohesive European role in the 
alliance.”89  
As seen later in its 1999 Strategic Concept, in addition to its core defense 
functions, it addressed security concerns for the 21st century: weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons, 
terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, the “disruption of the flow of vital resources” 
and the “uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a 
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consequence of armed conflicts.”90  This was a critical strategic step considering what 
was to come in 2001.    
3. The Terrorist Attacks on 11 September 2001 and Beyond  
On 11 September 2001, within 24 hours of the terrorists attacks against the United 
States on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Treaty.  
Although the U.S. decided not to use NATO in its Afghanistan operations initially, 
NATO agreed to take individual and collective action to support operations against 
terrorism.  Based on a request from the United States, on 04 October 2001 NATO 
Secretary Lord Robertson made a statement reflecting eight areas in which NATO was 
ready to assist in the war against terrorism: 
• Enhanced intelligence sharing and cooperation 
• Providing assistance to Allies, under terrorist threat, while engaging in 
supporting operations against terrorism 
• Increased infrastructure security on U.S. and allied territory 
• Replace NATO assets that need to be utilized for direct support of terrorist 
operations 
• Give blanket overflight clearances to U.S. and allied aircraft for military 
operations against terrorism 
• Provide access for U.S. and allied forces to port and airfield facilities on 
NATO territory during anti-terrorism operations 
• Readiness to deploy STANAVFORMED assets to the Eastern 
Mediterranean for purposes of presence and allied solidarity 
• Readiness to deploy NATO AWACS in support of operations against 
terrorism91 
In accordance with these areas of readiness, specifically the last point, NATO made 
another unprecedented move: to send AWACS to assist in air surveillance over the U.S. 
during Operation Noble Eagle as an Article 5 operation.92  Officially known as Operation 
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Eagle Assist, seven NATO AWACS provided surveillance operations from 19 October 
2001 to 16 May 2002.93  In concluding the assistance operations, The New York Times 
reported NATO AWACS having flown more than 360 missions, consisting nearly a 
quarter of all AWACS flights flown over the U.S during that period with 830 crew 
members from 13 allied nations.94  According to Nora Bensahel, writing for RAND, five 
NATO AWACS were deployed to the United States and in February 2002 two additional 
NATO AWACS were sent to provide security over Salt Lake City, Utah during the 
Winter Olympics.95  For NATO, Operation Eagle Assist was very significant for several 
reasons: it symbolized Alliance solidarity and it marked the beginning of new security 
missions for NATO: surveillance for major public events.  As shown later in Chapter IV, 
NATO’s surveillance assistance, coordination and information sharing in securing 
airspace for a specific event became a model for future NATO security missions.96   
As NATO looked to the Prague Summit later in 2002, the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks were the driving force behind NATO’s commitment to transformation 
and defending against acts of terrorism.  In 2002 NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Robertson spoke to developing Alliance responsibilities directed toward terrorist threats.  
Specifically, he gave four areas where NATO military roles could continue to be of 
benefit: (1) terrorist threat identification; (2) protection of military and civilian 
infrastructure as well as populations; (3) response mechanisms to terrorist attacks; and (4) 
preemptive military action against terrorists.97  These areas of NATO-focused 
responsibilities toward new security threats were formalized at the Prague Summit in 
November 2002.  Top priorities for NATO at the Summit included responses to the 
WMD threat and transforming NATO military capabilities in three aspects: 
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• Streamlining NATO military command structures 
• Developing a NATO Response Force 
• Improving military capabilities in specific areas, especially in intelligence 
and surveillance, flexible deployment capability, increased force 
protection and defense against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons98 
On 21 November 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government declared their 
commitment to a strengthened NATO based on furthering measures outlined in its 
Strategic Concept.  The Prague Summit Declaration reflects new commitments to 
increased security and stability through the Mediterranean Dialogue, the NATO-Russia 
Council and Partnership for Peace (PfP). Additionally, the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment (PCC) was approved.99  PCC was an important step for the Alliance 
because it replaced the “uneven progress” seen through the non-“nation-specific” 
commitments made in 1999 through the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).100  Under 
PCC, individual NATO countries agreed to focus on mission-specific capability 
improvements.   
Given the roles identified by Lord Robertson in early February 2002 and the 
agreements made at the Prague Summit, NATO’s participation in the security construct 
for the 2004 Summer Olympics is a reflection of new emphasis on its security 
capabilities.  In December 2003, the outgoing NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, 
stressed an important point about capabilities.  Improving NATO’s military capabilities 
“has to remain the key priority of any Secretary General because the credibility of the 
Alliance depends on it having the capability to take action.”101   
In 2003 Allied members took action to increase security operations in the Euro-
Atlantic region, both by indirect and direct support of the Olympics.  In the lead up to the 
Summer Olympics, the Alliance took important steps to increase its capabilities and 
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further NATO’s security goals.  In September of 2003, NATO conducted its first 
maritime and amphibious capabilities exercise in the Irish Sea under a new Higher 
Readiness Force Headquarters.  This exercise, named Northern Light 2003, was 
significant because it was a testing ground for NATO expeditionary maneuvers, as it 
developed its NATO Response Forces (NRF) capabilities.102  The United States 
participated in this exercise along with several other European nations.   
Additionally, on 05 March 2003, the United States recognized NATO efforts to 
expand its naval patrols to increase security in the Mediterranean region.  Under 
Operation Active Endeavour, which was considered part of the Summer Olympics 
mission for NATO, Alliance naval forces assumed missions to escort Allied non-
combatant ships traveling through the Straits of Gibraltar.  With the U.S. Navy that has 
decreased in size over the years to just over 300 ships, this was a welcomed gesture,  
The consensus to extend Operation Active Endeavour to the western 
Mediterranean strengthens NATO’s counterterrorism capability and 
demonstrates NATO’s firm commitment to meeting the threat of terrorism 
wherever it may come.103 
Further support to the 2004 Summer Olympics came in March and April through 
Joint Task Force (JTF) Exercise Agile Response 2004 which served as an eight-day 
international cooperative effort with Greece again designed specifically to support the 
Summer Olympics.  This exercise “tested joint command-and-control functions, refined 
response options to numerous simulated contingency scenarios, and demonstrated the 
strength of “One Team – One Fight.”104  One of the main focuses on the exercise was to 
test and analyze JTF’s responses to scenarios for the Olympics.  All of these joint 
operations represented more than just words.  Such large-scale coordination is “action,” 
representative of a strengthening and committed Alliance to transformation and enhanced 
allied cooperation.  As one would expect, NATO has many challenges ahead in managing 
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expanding missions and maintaining allied cooperation with existing and new members.  
David Yost, professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California notes: 
The challenge is to preserve the Alliance’s coherence and effectiveness 
while reconciling the traditional role of collective defense with the new 
roles of cooperation with non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic 
region, and crisis management and peace operations…Significant 
problems of practical implementation have arisen and threaten to continue, 
involving disagreements among the NATO countries and, in some cases, 
participants in the Partnership for Peace.  Managing these problems and 
disagreements and preserving the Alliance’s ability to fulfill its traditional 
core mission of collective defense, as well as the new roles, will represent 
an enormous challenge.105    
Today, NATO demonstrates a wide range of collective defense and security 
mission capabilities, but improvement continues.  The Alliance is enhancing its 
capabilities and expanding its regional cooperation efforts.  In this respect, 2004 was an 
important year for NATO.  At the Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June, the Alliance, 
consisting of 26 member countries, agreed to expand its operations in Afghanistan, 
committed to training Iraqi security forces, acknowledged the full operational status of its 
CBRN Defense Battalion as well as the initial operational capability of the NRF, and 
enhanced regional cooperation in the Mediterranean and Middle East through the Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative.106  As it approached the Olympics, NATO’s priorities were on 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but its security coordination with Greece was not limited.  The next 
section explores the effort and extent of NATO’s significant role in the Summer 
Olympics in more detail. 
B. NATO AND OLYMPIC SECURITY 
Since 11 September 2001 a heightened terrorist threat meant unprecedented 
security measures for the Olympics.  Through bilateral relations, Greece and the United 
States worked together to essentially prepare Athens before NATO’s arrival.107  
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Although the United States used military action after the Al Qaeda attacks on 11 
September 2001 beginning in Afghanistan, the fight began on many diplomatic fronts as 
well, Greece being one of them.  In 2002, both the U.S. government and IOC pressured 
the Greek government to combat the terrorist organization 17 November (17N).  For 
years, Greek rhetoric dominated and clouded any real effort to stop this domestic 
terrorism.108  Both 17N and another domestic terrorist group, the Revolutionary Popular 
Struggle (ELA), who desired the end of U.S. and NATO presence in Greece, had a long 
history of attacking foreign representatives, U.S. and NATO officials.109  It wasn’t until 
the capture of an injured bomber though, in June 2002, that efforts to defeat November 
17 dramatically increased.110  Despite Greek Police Chief Fotis Nasiakos’ statement, 
“17N does not exist anymore,” the U.S. State Department kept 17N on its list of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations.111         
The U.S. had demonstrated a high degree of security concern for the 2004 
Summer Olympics for many years.  The source of this concern, of course, was the 
international threat of terrorism.  On 08 March 2004, the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations met in a closed briefing to discuss security preparations for the 
Olympics games.  One of the briefers was the Honorable Cofer Black, Coordinator for 
Counter-Terrorism.  Despite the U.S. administration understandably trying to downplay 
the threat of terrorism publicly, as preparations for the Summer Olympics were being 
made, potential terrorist attacks were a legitimate concern.  Initially, the Greek 
government and some elements within the U.S. Foreign Service were reluctant to admit a 
Balkan terrorist threat, for example.  By January 2004, however, comments by U.S. and  
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European officials, though, slowly revealed the likely presence of Islamist terrorists in the 
Balkans.112   
Given this apparent evidence, intelligence experts continued to share terrorist 
information which was thought of to involve a new wave of terrorism against the 
Olympic Games.113  Osama bin Laden’s public offer to the Europeans on 15 April 2004 
regarding a “peace treaty” added possible credibility to a terrorist threat against the 
Olympics.  With a “door of peace” that “remained open” for three months, his offer was a 
window of opportunity which expired several weeks before the Olympics began.114  
While this may be an exaggerated revelation, nevertheless increased concerns for the 
Olympics Games led U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, days later on 19 
April 2004 to include the Olympics on a list of potential terrorist targets.115  While this 
threat may not have materialized, it was significant to intelligence agencies in that 
security for the Olympics was a high-priority to the Bush administration. 
It is clear that NATO’s support augmented an already serious Greek security 
plans.  With the Hellenic Police, (the Ministry of Public Order) and the Olympic Games 
Security Division (OGSD) in charge of Olympic security,116 the Greek government took 
its responsibilities seriously.  It contracted with a U.S.-based security company, Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to provide additional security measures in 
Athens.  Although Greece is very concerned about its national sovereignty, it took 
measures early in 2000 to include the international community in security operations 
planning.117  Although discussions on NATO involvement in Greece actually took place 
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before the train bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004, it was the day after this incident 
Greece officially requested NATO security assistance.  The Greek decision to formally 
involve NATO was an important one for the Alliance.  NATO participation in the 
Olympics represented NATO’s continuing adaptability because it has the ability take 
action.  
The Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 in Spain only confirmed the need for an 
even greater extensive security plan.  NATO’s participation in the Olympics provided an 
overall “security umbrella”118 to an already extensive Greek Olympic plan.119  As 
explored in greater detail in the next section, the final security plan between NATO and 
Greece was a result of months of negotiations.  After months of “informal” meetings on 
Olympic security in the early part of 2004 between senior Greek and NATO officials, the 
application to NATO reflected the degree of security measures necessary to protect the 
Olympics.120  Even with the extensive security measures Greece had already taken in 
early 2004, former Defense Minister, Yiannos Papantoniou believed more assistance 
would have to be required.  In an early interview on 09 March 2004 with The Guardian, 
Papantoniou referenced the Greek constitution and suggested a standby force would take 
the shape of the U.S. 6th Fleet patrolling offshore.121  The report also included the 
participation of a NATO Czech CBRN Defense battalion, with no specifics on role or 
location.  According to the former Foreign Ministry’s coordinator for the Games, in 
referencing the task of coordinating external support, stated “the logical and most 
efficient thing for Greece to do is to apply to NATO for assistance…NATO will ensure 
good coordination of assistance and, that way, we can avoid paying the price of 
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negotiating on a bilateral level with a variety of countries.”122  It was only a few days 
later when the official Greek request was submitted to NATO.    
1. Greece’s Negotiations with NATO  
After the center-right New Democracy party under Costas Karamanlis won the 
general elections on 07 March 2004, it was generally expected that Athens would request 
NATO support to ensure the Games’ security.123  This expectation became a reality just 
one day after the 11 March 2004 terrorist Madrid bombings when Greece officially 
requested NATO assistance.  On 12 March 2004 the Greek request compromised of four 
“demands”: 
• Early warning aircraft 
• Assistance of the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean in “patrolling 
international waters 
• “the availability to Greece of a Battalion specialized in countering nuclear, 
biological, radiological and chemical incidents 
• “the provision of other non-military means, such as rescue and sanitary 
units, decontamination of biological and chemical elements, as well as 
additional medical provisions.”124 
Less than a week later on 18 March 2004 the Greek request for NATO assistance 
to the Summer Olympics was unanimously approved by the NATO Council of Permanent 
Representatives in Brussels, with details to still be decided on.  Greece’s Permanent 
Representative, Yiannis Zeppos thanked the Council and commented favorably on the 
Alliance’s solidarity and support for the Olympic Games.125  During the following weeks 
expectations were high that NATO would assist Greece in order to make sure the 
Olympics were as secure as possible.  According to the U.S. ambassador to NATO, 
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Nicholas Burns, NATO was responding “very positively” to the Greek request, as a 
formal decision to approve assistance was expected in “the coming weeks.”126 
Talks on exact security arrangements between Greece and NATO continued.  On 
16 April 2004 Commander of NATO’s Joint Force Command, U.S. Admiral Gregory 
Johnson met with Greek Armed Forces Chief General Giorgos Antonakopoulos and 
Public Order Minister Giorgos Voulgarakis to discuss the Alliance’s role in the 
Olympics.  According to a Greek defense official, even though Greek government 
officials had said NATO would provide support outside Greece’s territory, Admiral 
Johnson was described as having “discussed the possible deployment of battalion officers 
near Athens.”127   
Months later on 22 May 2004 Greece and NATO finally agreed on security 
arrangements for the Olympic Games.  According to Greek newspaper, Athens Axia, 
agreement was reached to use the NRF option as a deterrent standby force which would 
be deployed in manner to respond to an incident in Greece as necessary.  This decision, 
however, was made with the intervention of Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to 
NATO.128  The agreement called for remaining NATO resources to be used as a “security 
package” which included AWACS patrols, ship inspections and teams trained in nuclear, 
biological and chemicals threats.  Out of this agreement, it was understood Greece would 
act as leading agent and NATO would function as a support mechanism. 
On 04 June 2004 Athens newspaper Ta Nea reported a Greek request to NATO 
for another battalion with the capabilities of emergency rescue.  Not being a part of the 
“non-military” rescue capabilities initially requested, this new requirement for a NATO 
“evacuation team” was identified by security planners after several international security 
exercises had been conducted.  Listed as a possible scenario is a mostly U.S. team under 
the NATO flag to respond from an aircraft carrier or large deck amphibious ship 
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steaming in international waters close to the Greek mainland.129  (This article also 
mentions several NATO analysts being deployed to Athens to evaluate intelligence 
reports at the Olympics Information Center and through each nation’s intelligence 
services, all a part of the original security package requested by Greece.)130 
2. NATO’s Commitment to the Summer Olympics 
There was no doubt in the Secretary General of NATO’s mind when he 
announced the readiness and willingness of NATO to support the Olympics.  During a 
visit to Athens on 19 and 20 February 2004 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, “NATO can 
assist, NATO will assist, NATO is in a position to assist.”131  In June 2004 Scheffer’s 
ability to deliver became a reality.  On 25 June 2004 Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) was authorized to begin NATO assistance to the Hellenic forces providing 
security to the Summer Olympics.132  NATO’s role was officially outlined on 02 August 
2004 when Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples released its first “Factsheet.”  NATO’s 
operations officially termed Distinguished Games were supportive of the Hellenic 
government, while Greece retained full responsibility for overall security operations for 
the Olympic and Paralympic Games.133  NATO’s role was additionally characterized by 
being, “supplementary to Greek national operations…in a supporting and augmenting 
role” demonstrating “Allied solidarity in contributing to security for NATO members.”134  
NATO’s period of coverage, from 02 August to 30 September 2004 included both the 
Olympic and Paralympic Games with specific NATO support to Greece as follows: 
• AWACS deployment for airspace surveillance 
• Maritime surveillance through Operation Active Endeavour 
• deployed elements of the NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear Defense Battalion (MN CBRN Def BN) 
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• improved intelligence sharing 
The listed overall objective of Olympic security assistance was:  
To demonstrate Alliance resolve and support to the campaign against 
terrorism, while underpinning the NATO Military Concept for Defense 
against terrorism through specific actions.  The military objective of this 
activity is to assist Greek Military Authorities in ensuring the safe conduct 
of the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games.135 
Several more “Factsheets” followed adding to the scope of coordinated NATO 
and Greek security efforts.  JFC Naples Factsheet “Combined Air Operations Center 
(CAOC) 7” specified NATO air surveillance for the Olympics.  One of five such 
operations centers, CAOC 7 was tasked to provide support to the 2004 Olympic and 
Paraolympic Games as follows: 
• Plan air surveillance operations. 
• Manage Hellenic airspace and coordinate with Greek air traffic assets and 
coalition forces. 
• “Task the allocated assets for defensive air operations in allocated 
airspace.” 
• “Coordinate air operations with Host Nation and, land and maritime 
forces.”136 
JFC Naples Factsheet “Task Force Endeavour” outlines NATO naval operations 
in the Mediterranean in support of the Summer Olympics.  As noted by this Factsheet, 
Operation Active Endeavour was actually activated on 26 October 2001 as part of the 
NATO Article 5 response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.  The Standing 
Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM) provided direct support during the Olympics by 
providing “early warning of any vessels suspected of conducting or supporting an 
intended terrorist organization against the Games.”137 
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Another JFC Naples Factsheet “Multinational (MN) CBRN Task Force (TF)” 
explained the contribution of NATO’s CBRN capabilities to security operations for the 
Summer Olympics.  As a part of the NATO MN CBRN Defense Battalion, the CBRN TF 
was deployed to Halkida, Greece to support Hellenic CBRN capabilities in order to 
“mitigate the effects of a CBRN incident on the civilian population centres [sic] and/or 
Olympic Venue Sites.”138  The CBRN TF’s missions in support of the Olympics and 
Paralympics were: 
• Coordinate with local and civil defense agencies and establish contingency 
plans 
• Establish an NBC Collection Center (NBC CC) 
• Perform NBC surveillance 
• Sample for CBR agents and perform lab analysis 
• Perform personnel, vehicle and ground decontamination 
• Execute station/site decontamination as needed         
The final JFC Naples Factsheet “EADRCC Assistance to Greece” described in 
more detail NATO’s emergency planning efforts.  Its scope included “civil emergency 
planning, disaster relief and consequence management” with coordination performed by 
the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).139  As a 
coordinating center for terrorist attacks during the Olympics, EADRCC was supported by 
26 of the 46 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) nations.  Through EADRCC 
these nations (on a cyclical basis) made additional CBR and “disaster” response units 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF GREEK – NATO COOPERATION 
As seen through the history of Greece post World War II, Greek public opinion 
has been heavily influenced, fairly or not, by historical issues.  Whether it is the legacy of 
U.S. involvement in Greek domestic affairs through the Truman Doctrine (as explored in 
Chapter II), Greek-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean, or the high degree of 
opposition to the war against Iraq, Greek public opinion has played an important role in 
Greek national security.  This was true for U.S. bilateral relations with Greece in 
negotiating security arrangements for dignitaries and athletes during the Olympics and 
for NATO’s role in security support during the Games. 
A. ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND RHETORIC  
  It is not a secret that in 2004 a number of organizations protested either the 
Olympics, U.S. influence in security measures or NATO involvement in the Games.  On 
25 February 2004, during an IOC meeting in Athens, protestors held a demonstration 
protesting against the installed surveillance measures in Athens.  With protestors only 
numbering in the hundreds, the emotions of those protesting was reflected in this quote, 
“We don’t accept a police state or an invasion by the United States and NATO.”140  
Another event such as the Greek Communist Youth (KNE) Anti-Imperialist weekend, 
held on 10 and 11 July 2004, brought youth under the guise of the Communist Party of 
Greece together to protest NATO and multinational companies’ involvement in the 
Olympics.141  Yet another protest came later on 22 July 2004 when approximately 1,000 
people marched against the Olympics due to “security excesses.”142  While these protests 
were small in number, history has its place in Greece.143  According to The New York 
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Times, feelings of bitterness still reside in Greeks over the U.S. government’s support of 
the junta from 1967 to 1974.144  Konstantinos Kotzias believes:  
The American involvement in the dictatorship and responsibility for the 
division of Cyprus were prominent themes which reinforced…the dogma 
of ‘Proud Greece’…in which…socialist revolutionary ideas appealed to 
Greeks as they could historically identify with the struggle against foreign 
dominance.145   
Greece’s temporary withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure in 1974 due 
to NATO’s “inaction” to respond to the Turkish intervention and its opposition to the war 
in Iraq146 constitute historical points reflecting high points of Greek emotional public  
opinion.  But, a recent public opinion survey adds context to understanding Greek public 
opinion.  According to a poll taken by V. Project Research Consulting (VPRC) in April 
2004, the intensity of opposition against foreign involvement during the Olympics 
reflected only a small percentage of the general population:         
APPROVAL OF COOPERATION OF GREEK AND FOREIGN 
SECURITY SPECIALISTS FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
  April-04 (2) 
  % 
Favor strongly 43 
Favor not strongly 38 
Oppose not strongly 7 
Oppose strongly 8 
Don't know 4 
N 1847 
VPRC: Database 1994-2004  
  
Question text: Do you favor or oppose Greek forces cooperating with foreign 
security specialists during the Olympic Games? 
 
Table 1. Greek Opinion on Security Specialists.147 
                                                 
144 Carassava, Anthee.  “Anti-Americanism in Greece is Reinvigorated by War,” The New York Times, 
B12, 07 April 2003.   
145 Kotzias, Konstantinos.  “September 11 and the War Against Terrorism: The Greek Reaction,” 
Contemporary Review, November 2002, 264. 
146 According to a poll reference in the New York Times article, “Anti-Americanism in Greece is 
Reinvigorated by War,” 94 percent of Greeks were against the war in Iraq. 
147 VPRC is an independent public opinion research organization located in Athens, Greece.  This data 
was provided by Vassilis Filippou, Department of Political Research.  More information on the institute is 
available at: http://www.v-prc.gr.  Accessed 30 November 2004. 
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Here, the majority of those interviewed favored the cooperation of Greek and 
foreign security specialists.  Of 1,847 people, 81 percent favored cooperation among 
security organizations.  This evidence is contrary to the Greek press’ reporting on 
concerns over armed U.S. security personnel.148  The debate in the media began over an 
article in The New York Times that asserted Greece was allowing 400 U.S. Special Forces 
to carry weapons during the Olympics.149  The debate continued to include armed guards 
escorting foreign countries’ athletes, but statements by Greek Public Order Minister 
Voulgharakis and by U.S. Ambassador Miller brought some stability against some of the 
emotionally-charged reports.  Greek newspaper I Kathimerini quoted Voulgharakis 
saying, “Visits by foreign heads of state are regulated by a special security protocol” 
while IOC protocol and Greece maintain Greek protection of the venues.150             
While “solidarity” and “community” is often a sign of strength, it is also a 
reflection of rhetoric during speeches and summits.151  The actual practice of U.S.-
European relations is very much a political process.  At the highest levels, competing 
interests between national and alliance priorities always exist.  As can be seen in the 
definition of alliance, “an alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security 
cooperation between two or more states.”152  Acknowledging state interests, Walt 
continues, “The primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members’ 
capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests.”153  Security preparations for 
the 2004 Summer Olympics between Greece and NATO have highlighted the difficulties 
that arise when alignment of these interests are put to the test. 
Earlier this year, Greek expectations and NATO interests conflicted when the 
scope of NATO ground troop involvement in the Olympics came into question.  As 
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mentioned earlier, on 12 March 2004, the day after the Madrid bombings, Greece 
formally requested NATO assistance.  The general nature of this request however, led to 
concern about the deployment of the NRF in Greece.  For weeks, during high level 
NATO representative and the Military Committee meetings, General James Jones, 
Supreme Commander of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) believed, “the 
security of an international event such as the Olympic Games could not be guaranteed 
unless he was in a position to deploy the best assets available to the alliance, the 
NRF.”154  The issue was not about NRF capabilities, it was about the politics of how the 
NRF was to be utilized when challenged by the framework of the Greek constitution.  
Specifically the debate concerned, “Greek sensitivities on the question of stationing 
foreign troops on its soil.”155  The political debate focused on Article 27, which states:  
No foreign army shall be admitted within the boundaries of the Greek 
State, nor shall remain therein or pass through without a law passed by the 
absolute majority of the total number of deputies.”156   
A public opinion poll taken in 2004 revealed support and opposition to NATO assistance: 
APPROVAL OF NATO ASSISTANCE ON SECURITY MATTERS 
DURING THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
  April-04 (2) 
  % 
Favor strongly 29 
Favor not strongly 27 
Oppose not strongly 14 
Oppose strongly 21 
Don't know 10 
N 1847 
VPRC: Database 1994-2004  
  
Question text: Do you favor or oppose NATO helping Greek authorities on 
security matters during the Olympic Games? 
 
Table 2. Greek Opinion on NATO Assistance. 
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While 56 percent favored Alliance assistance, 35 percent opposed assistance in 
security operations for the Olympic Games.  In order to increase public support of 
NATO, the Greek government successfully advanced the command of NATO’s Standing 
Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) forces to a Greek Admiral earlier than 
anticipated.  To coincide with the beginning of the Summer Olympics, the turnover of 
command of NATO’s SNFM to Yiannis Karaiskos, originally planned for September 
2004 was moved forward to 05 August.  According to an article on TurkishPress.com this 
was a move to give command to the Greek officer earlier intended to, “boost public 
support for the alliance’s involvement in the massive security operation for the Athens 
Olympics.”157  NATO’s handling of this issue, however, generally followed the 
Alliance’s principles of solidarity.  In a community of member states, NATO as an 
organization recognizes the importance of national interests within an alliance: 
Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, 
participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to 
decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.158 
Because of this concern, NATO forces were expected to be beyond the borders of Greek 
territory in a ready standby mode.  The translation of this expectation into decision did 
not come easy however.  The disagreement between NATO’s Supreme Commander of 
SACEUR and Greece’s Defense Minister Spilios Spiliotopoulos highlighted different 
expectations between Greece and NATO.  In mid-May Nicholas Burns, intervened and 
helped reach an agreement between the two sides.  The agreement called for a “NRF3” 
force, instead of being deployed within Greek territory, to be on constant alert ready to 
intervene as a part of a “security package.”159   
The Greeks’ sensitivity on the matter can be understood given the history of 
foreign intervention in the Greek spectrum of domestic concerns and national security 
postures as reviewed in Chapter I.  As a good example of public opinion, a humorous 
version of Greek perceptions on outside assistance to Olympic security is displayed in the 
below cartoon from a Greek website (with translated text): 
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Figure 1.   Security During the Olympics 
The caption reads: “Woman personifying Olympiad carrying Olympic torch; Greek 
Police on left; NATO on right; black figure of Central Intelligence Service agent.”160  
Concerns about the placement of NRF, with respect to Greek borders, was high enough 
for Greece’s Public Order Minister George Voulgarakis to characterize the circumstances 
under which these troops would be used within Greece as a “World War Three” 
situation.161  This announcement came during a time of protest against the Greek 
government’s decision to allow U.S. armed guards into the Olympics to protect U.S. 
athletes and citizens during the Games.   
Further considerations of Greek-NATO coordination came with command and 
control design.  Under the security agreement NATO retained command and control over 
alliance resources from its Southern Command in Naples, Italy.  In what was deemed as 
potentially complicated, one exception to the rule fell under Greek command.  
“Renegade” aircraft, under a Greek regulation passed after 11 September 2001, could 
have only been shot down after a decision by the Greek prime minister or defense 
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minister.162  Overall, efforts to protect Greek interests while answering U.S. and 
international concerns over security was evidence of the competing internal and external 
pressures Greece faced in addressing security concerns for the Games. 
B. NATO’S “OUTER CORE” SECURITY MISSIONS 
International concerns of terrorism certainly had its effect on NATO readiness in 
its contributions of its CBRN Defense team and on the perception of Greece’s readiness 
to host the Games.  Pressures on Greece were manifested through the events of the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the Madrid bombings in Spain 
on 11 March 2004.  These horrific events undoubtedly required more security emphasis 
in an increased threat environment, but NATO was ready for the task.  In one sense, 
NATO’s participation in the security for the Olympic Games was a decision consistent 
with its transformation doctrine since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.  While this was 
a significant event for NATO, events such as ongoing NATO involvement in Afghanistan 
and security training considerations in Iraq somewhat overshadowed NATO’s mission in 
Athens.  Nevertheless, NATO’s actions in assuming a role in the Olympics should be 
considered important to Alliance continuity in that it follows a conceptual change that 
runs parallel to its expanded concept of operations from collective defense to its “out of 
area” and broad security modus operandi.163  NATO’s participation in the security of a 
major, global sporting event speaks to its adaptability and overall flexible mandate that 
has been in place since it was ratified in April 1949.  Its basic language lends to 
considerable political maneuvering and potential for changing national and military 
strategies.164  For decades, the “institutionalization” of the Alliance structure and 
cooperation mechanism has led to diverse capabilities and overall sustainability.   
According to Stephen M. Walt, “some experts now see NATO evolving from a 
defensive alliance into a more diverse, ‘security management institution’, whose purpose 
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is both collective defense and managing a varied array of low-level security 
problems.”165  In this sense, NATO’s participation in the security measures for the 
Olympics is a continuation of the changes made to the alliance’s purposes as described in 
Chapter III.  In 1999 NATO’s new Strategic Concept affirmed the continuing need for 
defense as its core mission, but also reflected a new direction toward a broad approach in 
security missions.  From an “armed attack” and the “right of individual or collective self-
defense” to increased attention to terrorism, sabotage, organized crime and the “flow of 
vital resources,” the Alliance took on new security missions.166  As author Stanley Sloan 
suggests, “One way of looking at the relationship between collective defense and 
NATO’s new tasks is to see them as inner and outer core missions.”167  In this context, 
NATO’s “inner core” assumes the role of its fundamental collective defense capabilities 
while the “outer core” is reserved for the Alliance’s new security missions.  This 
distinction is helpful in understanding the expanding spectrum of missions NATO is 
performing to fulfill its security obligations.  NATO participation in providing security 
for the 2004 Summer Olympics is another chapter in the evolution of the Alliance 
adapting to new security challenges.   
Prior to the Olympics, NATO’s Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AWACS) 
surveillance and coordination capabilities proved to be an increasingly useful tool to 
providing security for public events.  Just after NATO ended its AWACS patrols over the 
U.S. (already discussed as part of the security measures in response to 11 September 
2001 and in providing surveillance for the Winter Olympics in Utah), in June 2002 
NATO surveillance capabilities, this time, supported the Food and Agriculture 
                                                 
165 Walt, Stephen M. quoted in Why Alliances Endure or Collapse, Strategy and Force Planning 
Faculty, Strategy and Force Planning, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, 327.  For 
further details for the evolution of defense to security, the author recommends McCalla, NATO’s 
Persistence, pp.466-468 which describes NATO’s “de-emphasis” on defense and references the wider 
range of non-Article 5 contingency capabilities through its Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept 
approved in 1994.    
166 The concept of “self-defense” can be found in the original Washington Treaty under Article 5.  
NATO’s new security interests are referenced in paragraph 10 and 24 of the 1999 Strategic Concept.  See 
note 159 for document location.   
167 Sloan, Stanley R., “Force Planning and Modernization: Developing Capabilities for the 21st 
Century,” NATO and Southeastern Europe: Security Issues for the Early 21st Century, edited by Dimitris 
Keridis and Robert L. Pflatzgraff Jr., (Virginia: Brassey’s Inc., 2000), 39. 
45 
Organization (FAO) meeting in Rome.  Later in June 2003 NATO also decided to assist 
the EU Summit held in Greece.   
In late March 2004, after the Madrid bombings, Portugal became very interested 
in pursuing NATO’s security assistance during Euro 2004, the European football finals 
that occurred during the summer.  During parliamentary debate in Portugal it was 
announced, “The Portuguese ambassador to NATO will formally request that NATO help 
Portugal strengthen security during the big events which will take place in the 
country.”168  Mr. Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, the Portuguese Prime Minister said, “the 
military alliance could provide surveillance planes and offer logistical support during the 
football finals and a music festival.”169  As NATO AWACS provided surveillance for 
several more events, to include the Barcelona Forum and the Madrid wedding ceremony 
for Crown Prince Felipe and Letizia Ortiz in May 2004, just a month later starting in June 
NATO surveillance and early warning was employed for the Euro 2004 Portuguese 
Championship.170   
In what amounts to a NATO security package, each event’s defense measures 
were enhanced by NATO AWACS.171  Similar action, with more robust measures and 
coordination efforts, occurred in coordinating security for the Olympics.  As previously 
discussed in Chapter III, NATO used significant resources to implement security 
measures for the games, but it would be on a support basis.172 
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C. NATO CHALLENGES 
1. Burden-sharing  
It goes without saying that NATO has experienced its share of burden-sharing 
difficulties over the years.  From the U.S. ratification debates173, through the Cold War 
and to the present day, maintaining equitable contributions between Allied members is an 
important planning consideration for NATO.  The lead up to the 2004 Summer Olympics 
proved to be no exception.  In early 2004 NATO faced mounting pressure to expand its 
operations in Afghanistan; Greece had just completed its operational planning phase for 
Olympic security and, at the beginning of January, began its “Security Measures 
Operational Phase.”  Proof of burden-sharing difficulties174 came from the interaction 
between NATO and Greece over Afghanistan and the Summer Olympics.   
When asked by NATO in February of 2004 Greece declined to contribute more 
troops to the NATO Afghanistan operations.  As any observer could anticipate, Greece’s 
response was supported by its defense requirements for security measures during the 
Summer Olympics in Athens.  NATO Secretary General Scheffer understood the 
response, but qualified it stressing the need to expand reconstruction team efforts beyond 
Kabul, "I realize fully the strains upon Greece in organizing the Olympic Games, but I 
sincerely hope that after the Olympic Games Greece will be able to participate."175  
According to Dhimitris Konstandakopoulos, Greece decided during the summer of 2004, 
just before the Istanbul Summit, to send additional troops to Afghanistan and potentially 
Bosnia as well.176 
Since Greece began its security reductions for the Summer Olympics in late 
August and early September 2004, it would appear Greek resources would be more 
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available for future NATO training and operations.177  While Greece needed a full 
spectrum of capabilities for security of the Summer Olympics, this placed indirect 
pressure on other NATO allies to contribute to NATO efforts outside of Kabul.  Wallace 
Thies argues the very nature of the Alliance encourages, “regularized channels for 
bargaining among the members over the distribution of burdens and benefits.”178  Given 
Thies’ research regarding burden-shifting179, Greece’s demonstration of exceeding 
expectations during the Olympics and its expected contributions in support of expanding 
operations in Afghanistan reflects an active and responsible NATO member.      
2. Czech Political Limitations on NATO 
On 25 May 2004, only a few days after NATO and Greece agreed on security 
arrangements for the Olympics, political delays in the release of NATO’s CBRN team 
from the Czech Republic and apparent concerns over cost arrangements, caused the 
Czech Defense Ministry to offer training to Greek soldiers in anti-chemical measures.180  
Ongoing discussions in the Czech parliament over approval of the deployment of the 
Alliance’s CBRN team, forced the Defense Ministry to look for options in order to meet 
the NATO requirement promised to Greece.  As a result, a Czech Defense Ministry 
spokesman said NATO had suggested training Greek soldiers as an option.181  In a 
manner characteristic of enduring alliances, the Czech Republic sought alternatives to 
being delayed by political pressure.  In an effort to avoid “declining credibility”182 the 
Republic decided to maintain its credibility with Alliance members, by staying 
committed to the Alliance’s CBRN defense mission for the Games.  In order to meet 
NATO obligations, the Czech Defense Ministry, in effect, offered to train approximately 
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60 Greek soldiers in anti-chemical protection for the Olympics.183  This did not become 
the final option as there was much at stake for the CBRN Defense team: providing 
support to the Olympics would be its first mission in which NATO forces were deployed 
to provide CBRN measures against terrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD).184   
The following day, Premier Vladimir Spidla in a public appearance suggested the 
government would ask parliament to utilize the Czech army which consists of chemical 
experts in the NRF CBN team, for deployment to security operations including the 
Summer Olympics.  According to the article, initial Czech desires to have costs covered 
did not materialize and therefore explored options to provide the capabilities to Greece.  
Overall concern regarding the delays in waiting for parliamentary consent upon a NATO 
request proved to be a considerable factor in the deployment of the team.185  
Finally, after nearly a month of deliberations in the Czech Republic, on 24 June 
2004, the Senate approved the Czech CBRN team deployment.  Through this 
authorization, the Czech government agreed to send 100 chemical detection specialists to 
assist Athens in protecting against a chemical attack.  Although at the Istanbul Summit 
the operational capability of the NRF CBRN Battalion was announced, NATO’s 
effectiveness was hampered by national political constraints.  With the NRF’s multi-
national anti-chemical warfare battalion, located in Liberec, North Bohemia the Czech 
Republic is the lead country in the project and, “is responsible for the establishment, 
preparation and deployment of the unit.”186  Although the Czech needed to gain 
parliamentary consent in advance to support Czech chemical experts in an operation 
during the Olympics, the parliamentary procedure was complicated and long in duration.  
These political constraints, however, did not mean a loss of capability for NATO as 
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NATO’s CBRN deployment was a significant milestone in NATO’s operational 
readiness.187      
D. GREECE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY  
Although not a focus of this research, it is important to note European Union (EU) 
involvement in integrating counter-terrorism security measures in Greece prior to the 
beginning of the of the Summer Olympics.  As measures in the continuing development 
of the European Security and Defense Identity (EDSI), the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Commissioner position, was an office established only in March 2004, as Europe’s first 
response to the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks.  According to an article in the Greek 
newspaper Athens Axia the EU Counter-Terrorism Commissioner, Guy de Vries, advised 
the Greek Parliament to ratify European laws concerning the fight against terrorism, 
which include provisions for extradition of suspects and for judicial cooperation.  The 
article continued and stated the commissioner believed, “that any further delay in 
approving the relevant legislation will undermine the effectiveness of trans-Atlantic 
cooperation against terrorism.”188   
Adoption of the new anti-terrorism legislation was very much a Greek political 
process.  According to an article in the Washington, D.C. Press Office through the 
Embassy of Greece the New Democracy party “tabled” the additional articles under 
consideration.  In regards to a previously decided upon decision-framework proposal 
developed by the European Council with the support of the previous Socialist party, the 
position of the New Democracy was that, it did not feel “obliged,” “to adopt the articles 
word for word and that there were margins for improvements to protect individual and 
political freedoms.”189 
In addition, the article continues and states the previous Socialist government was 
accused of ignoring opposition party objections.  Other viewpoints from legal experts 
were also apparently not heard sufficiently while not “allowing even a few days for 
                                                 
187 For a detailed “lessons learned” of NATO’s CBRN interoperability with Greek agencies see: 
“NATO learns CBRN Lessons from Duty at the Olympics,” RUSI/Jane’s Homeland Security and 
Resilience Monitor.  Available at: http://www4.janes.com (subscription only).  12 November 2004.  
Accessed 18 November 2004. 
188 Tarkas, Alexandros, FBIS article.  See note 142 for complete reference information. 
189 Parliament Passes New Anti-Terror Legislation, Athens News Agency, Hellenic Republic 
Embassy of Greece.  http://greekembassy.org.  Accessed 04 August 2004. 
50 
discussion of its bill by an expert panel.”190  Nevertheless, passing the new anti-terrorism 
laws was only one of many steps for the Greek government.  It also has to deal with 
implementation.  While meeting with EU interior ministers, Greek Justice Minister 
Anastassios Papaligouras promised to implement the EU anti-terrorism measures by the 
start of the Olympic Games.  Under pressure to implement the new legislation, the article 
attributes the delay in implementation to the Socialist government’s concern about 
persevering individual rights.191  Although controversial, the passing of new anti-terror 
legislation served as one of many steps toward security preparations for Europe and the 
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A. GREECE AND ITS REGIONAL STATUS 
As in any modern Olympics, the presence of athletes as representatives of their 
nations stirs up emotions of national sentiment.  This was the same in 1896 when Greece 
hosted the very first modern Olympics at the suggestions of French Baron Peirre de 
Coubertin.  Inspiration to revive the ancient Games came to him in the late 1880s when 
German archeologists discovered ruins in Olympia.192  The awarding of the 2004 
Summer Olympics, which began in 1997, was only the beginning of Greece’s many 
challenges in preparations for the Olympics.  Although Greece’s expenditure of 
approximately $1.2 billion to provide security for the Games threatened conflict with EU 
budget regulations,193 the increased security measures ultimately safeguarded the Games.     
For Greece, especially, hosting the Games of the XXVIII Olympiad was an extraordinary 
event symbolizing its history, culture and nationalist pride. 
Like other countries in Europe, up through to the 20th century Greece was a 
country marked by nationalism.  As elsewhere, this was a powerful force that was 
characterized by many elements of life including state, language, culture and religion.  
Greece has endured unique hardship through its War of Independence (1821-1832) 
against the Ottomans, German Nazi occupation during World War II, the Greek Civil 
War (1946-1949) and later in 1967 survived a military dictatorship for seven years until 
1974.  Despite these serious challenges, Greece is becoming a contributor to the modern 
world seeking balance in its foreign policy with the powers of the West and its 
neighboring European nations.    
Greece’s ancient history constitutes a heritage and culture and is a source of 
inspiration today, so artfully represented in the opening and closing ceremonies of the 
2004 Summer Olympics.  A combination of myth and history are elements described by 
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scholars in defining what “nationalism” represents.  The objective and subjective 
elements of history manipulated by individuals to appeal to a greater sum of individuals 
inevitably creates perception and ideas that are transformed into a culture.  Greek Prime 
Minister, Costas Karamanlis believes this aspect of Greek life is so important that he 
gave himself the title of Minister of Culture in addition to Prime Minister.194  Costas 
Karamanlis recognizes the importance of culture and he, as others do, also look to 
Greece’s future, “we want to be among the avant-garde of the European Union through 
reinforced cooperation.”195  This is a goal very different than the perception of a 
“victimized Greece;” a label that some believe still exists.  When author Konstantinos 
Kotzias discusses “just and unjust war” he refers to a Greek mentality; a “mentality of the 
victim, of the conspiracies, and as argued by many, the mentality of jealousy towards the 
powerful West.”196  But, he continues and asserts that this mentality is based on myth.  
The challenges faced by Greece and its resulting successes in hosting the 2004 Summer 
Olympics prove the vitality of Greece and its “spirited” population.  Greece is not a 
victim.  As Kotzias concludes: 
Considering Greece’s position in the world today and comparing Greece 
with its neighboring countries confirms that Greece is far from being a 
victim of Western imperialism.  Although its Western direction was 
largely compulsory and enforced upon it, it has proved to be most 
beneficial.197    
Indeed, Greece’s request for NATO support revealed elements of Greek public opinion 
and national security concerns that have long been rooted in Greek history.  Greece must 
acknowledge its past and look to the future.  Greece has matured and it is shaping its own 
destiny.  Since the late 1990s, former Prime Minister Costas Simitis and now Costas 
Karamanlis are focusing on regional cooperation, including rapprochement with Turkey 
                                                 
194 Migdalovitz, Carol, Greece Update, CRS Report for Congress.  (Order Code RS21855), 03 June 
2004, CRS-3.  Note: The city of Patras, Greece has been chosen as the 2006 European city of Culture.   
195 Mahony, Honor, “Greece Wants to be Among the Avant Garde in the EU,” EU Observer, 
http://www.euobserver.com/?aid=17061.  Accessed 09 August 2004. 
196 Kotzias.  Refer to Note 143 for complete reference information. 
197 Ibid. 
53 
and support for Turkish accession into the EU.198  A recent statement by Yannis-Alexis 
Zepos, Ambassador of Greece to NATO, supports Greece’s policy of looks toward 
regional stabilization and cooperation with NATO: 
Greece has always attached great importance to security in close 
conjunction with its wider geographical periphery, but most of all through 
its participation in international organizations such as the United Nations, 
the European Union and NATO.199 
Regarding the 2004 Summer Olympics, as many would agree, overall, the Olympic 
Games were very successful.  Athens newspaper, I Kathimerini, described its success at 
the level of being “exportable” in that:  
Dozens of foreign dignitaries praised the Public Order Ministry for the 
security…related inquires have already come from Germany, which is 
organizing the Soccer World Cup in two years, and from China, which is 
organizing the next Olympic Games.200   
On 14 October 2004 a New York Times article revealed a short story on Greece’s terror 
concerns during the Olympics.  According to the article, Greece’s most serious, at least 
unclassified, legitimate security threat came from a propane leak at a luxury resort where 
many high-profile Olympic sponsors resided.201  Greece’s hosting of a successful 
Olympics will serve to launch a “new Greece” into the 21st century.202  A public opinion 
poll taken in September 2004 reflects this sentiment which described Greece as a “safe 
destination” and a “modern European country” in which the Olympics “has enhanced 
perceptibly the position of Greece on the international stage.”203  
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B. THE FUTURE OF NATO AND NATO SECURITY 
In January of 2004, the new NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
traveled to the United States for the first time and met with President Bush in the Oval 
Office.  The theme of the visit was solidarity, NATO unity in the promotion of common 
values and strength within the alliance.  President Bush, in an effort to win more NATO 
support in Afghanistan and Iraq, stated, “I believe in NATO…I believe NATO is 
transforming itself and adjusting to meet the true threats of the 21st century.”204  On the 
same visit, Scheffer made a speech at the National Defense University proclaiming his 
simple message, “It’s time to get back to the basics.”205  While these public statements 
and speeches serve rhetorical purposes, there is an important reality for NATO behind 
these words.  Rhetoric is, “the medium for propagating conceptions about the nature and 
promise of NATO.206  Furthermore,  
The sheer diversity of conceptions suggests that NATO is a rather 
malleable instrument, and one that has meant many things over the 
years…the malleable nature of NATO has given the alliance an ability to 
change to meet the changing requirements of international political life 
and, ultimately, to survive.207 
NATO’s history is immense and it has often demonstrated its ability to pursue 
goals beyond rhetoric; goals that successfully combine rhetoric and action are providing 
results.  As demonstrated in this paper, NATO has taken incremental steps in improving 
its capabilities and expanded its operational commitments.  It has developed and 
approved new doctrine, it has engaged in cooperative security measures and exercises, it 
has sought out new security missions, it has established and implemented capabilities 
initiatives.208  NATO knows it needs to do more and it is, but as its members prepare to 
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accept new burdens, the United States, as the Alliance leader, “must be strongly 
committed to preserving the relationship and willing to expend the effort needed to keep 
its allies from straying.”209     
In order to better secure its national interests in a global, forward-presence 
environment, the United States needs to engage in more effective diplomacy with the 
Alliance’s members and repair the transatlantic rift.210  As the efforts to stabilize Iraq are 
revealing, the “unilateral” option is not the best option.  As Donald Abenheim, Professor 
at the Naval Postgraduate School says, “the key issue, by far, is the U.S. link to Europe.  
Whatever the many faults, frictions, and fatigue of keeping the United States “in” Europe, 
the alternative of a United States disengaged from Europe looms as far more 
dangerous.”211  While the operation in Iraq cannot be fairly compared to security 
operations planning for the Olympics, it is the emphasis on the multilateral aspect that is 
appealing to the strategic circumstances where the U.S. and NATO have the best 
immediate future.  A robust combination, as demonstrated in security planning for the 
Olympics, of multilateral relations and NATO resources should be used as a model for 
future “security umbrellas.”212  As explored in Chapter III, early U.S. involvement with 
Greece regarding 17N proved to be an important step in counter-terrorist efforts in 
preparation for the Summer Olympics.     
On the other hand, for European NATO members, if its forces are expected to be 
flexible and expeditionary in nature, its rapid response capability can not afford to be 
hampered by national policies and domestic politics.  While deployment challenges for 
the 2004 Summer Olympics were more evident for NATO’s CBRN resources, this logic 
applies to both NRF and CBRN capabilities.  NATO recognizes these challenges and 
Alliance leaders are taking measures as seen through the Istanbul Summit, to improve 
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NATO defense planning and political channels to ensure NATO assets are available for 
deployments when required.213  While an enlarging Alliance may create the umbrella of a 
greater security zone in Europe, as it faces obstacles to deploying an expeditionary NRF 
and flexible CBRN capability, NATO cannot afford to have its credibility marginalized.  
The NRF and its CBR battalion can be a critical capability in the Alliance’s fight against 
terrorism as long as it can be rapidly deployed.  
On a higher level, regarding transatlantic relations, this Euro-Atlantic relationship 
is in a transition, but it is not wholly a divide as grave as observers such as Robert Kagan 
suggest;214 it is experiencing an Olympic revival of its own.  George F. Kennan, the 
American diplomat and historian, once described the effective systems in international 
relations as,  
The only systems for the regulation of international life which can be 
effective over long periods of time are ones sufficiently stable, sufficiently 
pliable, to adjust themselves to constant change in the interest and power 
of the various countries involved.”215     
As NATO continues to develop its full spectrum of capabilities, it will 
undoubtedly be able to offer specialized security forces for future events.  The United 
States and its allies should continue to seek political multilateral mechanisms to 
effectively extend security beyond its borders where their respective interests lie.   
In closing, NATO’s participation in the security of the 2004 Summer Olympics is 
significant in several ways.  Although its AWACS surveillance (of such an event) had 
started in response to 11 September 2001 and continued over the 2002 Winter Olympics 
in Utah, NATO’s continuing excellence in early warning patrols and its complement of 
NRF and CBRN capabilities gave the Games an unprecedented level of counter-terrorism 
protection.  Granted NATO’s “security umbrella” can accurately be placed as an “outer 
core” mission, the Alliance’s emphasis on increased security initiatives (without 
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forgetting its core defense purpose) is necessary for safeguarding the freedoms of all 
member countries.  NATO also enhanced political cooperation with Greece serving as an 
agent to focus on Mediterranean security.  The Olympics also highlighted NATO’s 
transformational capabilities, through the deployment of the CBRN Defense team and the 
NRF.  NATO’s cooperation renewed its security commitment to the protection of its 
member countries.  The Alliance’s lessons learned from the Olympics experience will 
undoubtedly be applied to future integrated operations and training missions.  America, in 
its challenging mission in Iraq is working to coordinate new efforts toward the fight 
against terrorism.  Underneath the 2004 Summer Olympics was a determined U.S. and 
allied strategic effort to provide security and battle the threat of terrorism.  At the same 
time, Athens and the world’s citizens enjoyed the protection and stability brought on by 
such cooperative security measures.  NATO’s resources and coordination capabilities are 
still proving very useful.     
As the Alliance adjusts to events in the 21st century, the benefits of cooperative 
security measures should be used as a positive means to turn the page in the transatlantic 
relationship.  One can determine that the security for the 2004 Summer Olympics is 
definitely enhanced by NATO’s presence.  Its surveillance, command and control, 
increased CBRN capabilities and political and military coordination channels prove 
NATO’s legitimacy.  With increased political and military support from the United 
States, the Alliance will take several more years to become more fully capable.  In this 
sense, the U.S. must be patient and continue to reinvest in the transatlantic relationship.  
U.S. national security and global stability depends on continued NATO core defense and 
its “outer-core” security mission exploitation.  NATO’s global reach will require 
continued focus on the “security umbrella” method of operations as seen during the 2004 
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